

REPORT ON THE SINGLE SANCTION  
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

INVESTIGATION OF THE SINGLE SANCTION  
AD HOC COMMITTEE TO THE HONOR COMMITTEE

MARCH 2006

## Introduction

The Committee for the Investigation of the Single Sanction was formed in 2005 to provide data-driven information about the single sanction and its impact upon the Honor System and the community at-large. This report provides the Committee's findings in three areas of analysis:

- The potential impact of the sanction upon student rates of cheating.
- The potential impact of the single sanction upon the reporting of Honor cases to the Committee.
- The potential impact of the single sanction upon jury verdicts at Honor trials.

This report is divided into three sections, each related specifically to the above research questions.

In order to analyze student rates of cheating and reporting, the Committee utilized a survey conducted by Professor Don Mc Cabe, a faculty member at Rutgers University who has studied student cheating and Honor Systems for over fifteen years. To add to his longitudinal data set, Mc Cabe asked the Honor Committee to participate in a re-test of a cheating survey distributed in 1990 and 1995. This survey, distributed through both mail and the web at a number of colleges and universities nationwide asked respondents questions about their own cheating behavior, their perception of cheating behavior around them, and respondents' willingness to report knowledge of offenses to the appropriate body. The web-based version of the UVA questionnaire also asked respondents specifically about their feelings on the single sanction and its impact on their decision to report offenses. In addition to this information, the Committee also used a previous student survey conducted by the Honor Committee in 2000-2001.

Consideration of the impact of the single sanction upon jury verdicts consisted of a thorough examination of approximately five years worth of post-trial juror questionnaires. The methodology for this study is discussed in greater detail in the relevant section of the report.

## Part 1: Cheating Rates

Our analysis of cheating rates at the University is based upon a student survey conducted in the fall of 2005 by Don McCabe at UVA and several other schools with and without honor codes.

The objective in this analysis is to determine how the general cheating rate at UVA compares with the general cheating rate at other schools-those with and without Honor codes.

To do this, we will divide the relevant questions in the survey into two categories. The first category will include direct questions of respondents as to the frequency with which they have committed any one of a series of acts of cheating. The second category will include questions as to respondents' perceptions of cheating rates at their schools. In each category, we will compare the responses provided by UVA students with those provided by students at several other schools with and without honor codes. (Data from the other schools is included in the appendix.)

### Self-Reported Cheating Rates

One series of questions asks students to characterize the frequency with which they commit each of a series of acts of cheating. Below are the responses of UVA students organized by type of academic fraud.

#### **Specific Behaviors**

<b>Frequency of: (%)</b>	<b>Never</b>	<b>Once</b>	<b>&gt; Once</b>	<b>Not Rel</b>
<b>WORKING WITH OTHERS</b>				
Fabricating or falsifying lab data.	63	10	6	21
Working w/ others when asked for individual work.	64	16	17	3
Receiving unpermitted help on an assignment.	70	18	11	2
<b>TESTS</b>				
Getting Q/A from someone who has already taken test.	84	10	6	1
Helping someone else cheat on a test.	92	5	2	2
Copying during test with other's knowledge.	96	2	1	1
Copying during test w/o other's knowledge.	90	6	3	1
Using unpermitted crib notes during test.	93	4	1	1
Using electronic device as unauth. aid during exam.	95	2	1	2
Cheating on a test in any other way.	90	5	2	3
<b>PAPERS AND AT HOME INDIVIDUAL WORK</b>				
Fabricating or falsifying research data.	79	3	1	17
Copying another student's computer program.	61	5	3	32
Fabricating or falsifying a bibliography.	87	8	3	2
Copying sentences from written source w/o footnoting.	66	18	15	2

Copying from electronic source w/o footnoting.	64	20	15	1
Copying material, word for word, from written source.	96	2	1	1
Turning in paper obtained from term paper "mill" or site.	98	<1	<1	2
Turning in paper copied from another student's paper.	96	3	1	1
Turning in work done by someone else	97	2	1	1

### MISCELLANEOUS

Using false excuse to obtain extension.	79	13	7	1
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These responses by UVA students to direct questions about their own cheating do not appear to deviate much from the average response provided by students at other schools with Honor codes. Rarely do any of the numbers in any of the four columns deviate by more than five points. In the rare instance of noticeable deviation, UVA students sometimes report committing an act of cheating more often and sometimes they report the opposite. This suggests that the cheating rate at UVA is about the same as it is at other schools with Honor codes.

But the numbers do deviate more often from the average responses at schools without Honor codes. Often the numbers in the four columns change by more than ten points. Most often the change indicates that UVA students report committing acts of cheating less frequently than students at non-Honor code schools. This suggests that UVA students generally cheat less often than students at schools without Honor codes.

### Perceived Cheating Rates

Another way to discern the rate of cheating at UVA relative to other schools is to analyze student perceptions of the amount of cheating around them. Below are the questions from the McCabe survey which sought to glean student perceptions of cheating and the responses provided by UVA students.

1. "How would you rate...[the] effectiveness of [UVA's policy on cheating]?"  
 Very Low: 4%      Low: 22%      High: 56%      Very High: 19%

2. "How frequently do you think the following occur on campus?"

Plagiarism on written assignments

Never: 3%      Very Seldom: 43%      Seldom: 41%      Often: 11%      Very Often: 2%

Inappropriate sharing in group assignments

Never: 2%      Very Seldom: 19%      Seldom: 37%      Often: 31%      Very Often: 11%

Cheating During Tests or Examinations:

Never: 8%      Very Seldom: 50%      Seldom: 29%      Often: 9%      Very Often: 3%

3. "How often, if ever, have you seen another student cheat during a test/exam?"

Never: 70%      Once: 12%      Few Times: 14%      Several Times: 3%      Many Times: 1%

4. "How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"

Cheating is a serious problem on campus.

Disagree Strongly: 23% Disagree: 42% Not Sure: 27% Agree: 8% Agree Strongly: 1%

Again, comparisons with the responses by students at schools with and without Honor codes suggest that UVA students cheat less often than students at non-code schools and about as frequently as students with Honor codes.

Compared with the average responses by students at schools with Honor codes, the numbers from the UVA survey vary little. Occasionally UVA students perceive slightly more cheating in response to a question, and occasionally they perceive slightly less. Generally the numbers agree.

But compared with the average responses by students at schools without Honor codes, the numbers from the UVA survey deviate often. UVA students appear to almost always report a perception of the cheating rate around them which is lower than the average responses at non-code schools.

### Conclusions

Both categories of analysis suggest that UVA students generally cheat less frequently than students at schools without Honor codes and about as frequently as students at schools with Honor codes.

Next, we would like to offer some observations based on the frequency of academic fraud within each self-reporting category as it compares to the other categories. First, the highest rates of cheating are found within the "Working With Others" category of academic fraud, with an average of 26% of students having reported committing academic fraud at least once. Second, the lowest rates of cheating are found under the "Tests" category, with an average of 7% of students having committed academic fraud at least once. What is of further note here is that the question "Getting Q/A from someone who has already taken test" returned the highest rates within the "Tests" category (16%), which demonstrates linkage to the "Working With Others" Category. Third, in between the above two categories, "Papers And Other At Home Work" has an average rate of 11%. Finally, 20% of students have used false pretenses to gain an extension on an assignment.

Several conclusions can be reached based on the data. It appears that students are most likely to commit academic fraud when they are collaborating with other students in unproctored or loosely proctored environment. Students are very unlikely to cheat when presented with a formal exam or text. They are reluctant to submit papers or computer programs completely copied from another individual, but are quite likely to copy a portion of their material from a published (33%) or electronic (35%) source. This leads us to consider the likelihood that students consider the possibility of getting caught when deciding whether to cheat or not. It would be difficult to be caught if a student got unauthorized help, worked in a group on an assignment, or claimed falsified a reason to turn an assignment in late, but it would much more risky to cheat off of someone else's test or submit an entire paper from the internet. Another possibility is that students cheating rates are at variance based on their considerations of seriousness when committing a given act. For example, they may consider cheating on an exam to be a major transgression but working in a group where they contribute to the solution to be only a minor offense.

It is not possible to know with certainty whether the numbers reflected in the self-reported cheating and perceptions of cheating categories represent the actual cheating rate at UVA or other schools. But since the numbers from the two categories agree to the same conclusions, it seems safe to assume that the numbers and conclusions are at least roughly accurate.

The important question stemming from this analysis is what role the single sanction specifically has in depressing cheating at UVA. Only one of the other schools with Honor codes in the survey use a single sanction. Two possible conclusions that can be drawn from this are these:

1. There is no evidence available here that the single sanction is more successful at discouraging cheating than other sanctioning systems.
2. This means that either the single sanction is just as effective at discouraging cheating as other sanctions, or it plays no role in affecting the cheating rate and the simple presence of an Honor system alone is what discourages cheating. Perhaps a little bit of both is true.


## Part 2: Student Opinion

### The potential impact of the single sanction upon the reporting of Honor cases to the Committee

As discussed previously, part of the research project regarding the single sanction included an already-planned survey by Don McCabe, an expert regarding students cheating and Honor Codes. The Ad-Hoc Committee asked McCabe if he would be willing to add three questions to the UVa survey specifically regarding the single sanction. The following summarizes data from the single sanction-specific questions on the McCabe survey.

The survey was administered in the fall semester of 2005. McCabe asked that the survey be administered in both a web-based and paper form. He further asked that only the web-survey include the additional single sanction questions, therefore this portion of the report discusses data obtained from the web-based McCabe survey only. McCabe further stipulated that the survey be administered to upper-class students only, thus the instrument was distributed to 1000 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> year students, 257 students completed the survey, resulting in a response rate of 25.7%.







When asked to indicate on a scale of responses from “absolutely not” to “definitely”: “As a student, would you initiate an Honor case if you witnessed a clear Honor violation?,” the respondents provided the following results:




As may be noted from the above data, 39% of respondents indicated that they would be likely or very likely to report a case, 25% said they would be unlikely to report, 2% said they would absolutely not report, and 34% of respondents were not sure. This question was followed by a listing of potential factors that might deter a student from reporting a case, and respondents were asked to rate those factors on a similar sliding-scale.

The following charts provide a visual adaptation of the results related to the factors:

## Which Factors Would Deter You From Reporting an Honor Offense?







Surprisingly, a sizable majority of respondents (29%) indicated that “Fear of Legal Reprisal” would deter them from reporting an Honor case. These data seem to indicate that further education is required regarding students’ potential legal exposure as reporters in the System.

A troubling trend evident in the data is the close to majority of respondents (47%) who indicated that they would likely or definitely “Prefer Not to Get Involved.” Further, a majority of respondents (51%) indicated that they would likely or definitely be deterred because “Reporting and Following Through With a Case is Too Time Consuming.” This unwillingness to become involved indicates a serious concern for student-self governance at the institution if students would prefer to abdicate their responsibility to the Honor System based upon unwillingness to get involved or spend time with the System. Further education may be required in marketing materials and admissions packets to inform students about the expectations of living within a Community of Trust and students’ responsibility to report cases as members of this Community. Few students, however (5%), indicated that they would be deterred from reporting a case because “I do not believe in the Honor System.”


The data does indicate that the sanction could be a factor deterring many students from reporting Honor cases. 67% of respondents indicated that they would likely (45%) or definitely (22%) be deterred from reporting a case due to “Uneasiness about possibly causing the dismissal of another student.” When asked specifically if they would be deterred because they “did not agree with the single sanction,” a total of 33% (19% likely and 14% definitely) noted that this would likely or definitely have an impact upon their willingness to report, while 28% indicated that it would definitely not deter them, and 17% indicated that it would be unlikely. This indicates that some students who appear to agree with the single sanction in theory, have reservations about putting it into practice.

The nature of the assignment also appears to have an impact upon whether or not a student would be willing to report an Honor case. A vast majority (72%) of those responding indicated that “The seriousness of the offense” could deter them from reporting a case. A poor perception of the learning value or construction of the assignment also seems to potentially deter students from reporting, with a

large minority (41%) of respondents indicating that this would likely or definitely impede their willingness to bring a case. The difficulty of the assignment, however, does not appear to be a factor, with only 19% indicating that difficulty would be an issue.

From this data, it appears that the most powerful deterrent to reporting a case is a personal relationship of some kind with the suspected offender. 80% of respondents indicated that they would likely (45%) or definitely (35%) be deterred from reporting a case by "A Personal Relationship or Friendship with the Person Committing the Offense."

Finally, the survey asked a question specific to student opinion about the sanction itself: "The Honor System currently has a single sanction; any student who is found guilty of an intentional, serious act of lying, cheating or stealing is asked to leave the University. How would you characterize your feelings about the single sanction?" The chart below indicates that there is no clear majority opinion on this question, though 43% of students feel positive or very positive about the sanction.



In the 2000-2001 academic year, the Honor Committee conducted a student survey asking similar questions to those in this 2005 study, although response options were presented differently. The different response options make direct comparison difficult, but consideration of the 2000-2001 survey results can highlight potential changes in student opinion with respect to the single sanction.

Both surveys included a question asking students what factors would deter students from initiating cases and then listed several response options. The response options differ in that the 2005 survey offered a range of five choices within a given option (from "absolutely not" to "definitely"), while the 2000 survey listed similar options but did not allow the opportunity to select the degree to which that factor would deter them from reporting a case.

In this question about potential deterrents to reporting, both surveys provided the potential response: "I do not believe in the single sanction." In 2000, 17.8% of students surveyed indicated that they would be deterred from reporting an Honor case because they do not believe in the single sanction. In 2005, a combined 35% of students surveyed responded that their lack of belief in the single sanction would likely (19%) or definitely (14%) deter them from reporting an Honor case. This data appear to indicate that there is a larger base of students whose opposition to the single sanction would deter them from reporting an Honor case.

Both surveys also included a general question asking how students feel about the single sanction. The 2005 survey had five response options: (1) very negative (12%), (2) negative (26%), (3) neutral (20%), (4) positive (25%), and (5) very positive (18%). The 2000 survey had five different options: (1) I fully support the single sanction (19.5%), (2) I support the single sanction with some reservations (55.2%), (3) I do not support the single sanction at all (17.7%), (4) Not sure/not applicable (4.3%), and (5) other (3.3%).

Though it is difficult to make a direct comparison between the two data sets, the responses appear roughly similar.

Taking this data as a whole, it appears that the single sanction does exert some influence upon students' willingness to report cases to the Honor Committee. It is difficult to extrapolate whether the sanction is a controlling deterrent, however, or just one of many factors that students consider when weighing the pros and cons of bringing a case forward. From the perspective of this Committee, the most troubling information revealed is students unwillingness to bring cases due to issues of convenience, such as the time commitment or simply wishing to stay out of the situation. These data should concern any system based upon collective responsibility and action.

## Part 3: Jury Verdicts

### **The Jury Process in Brief**

During jury deliberations, jurors take two votes: one on act/intent and one on seriousness. Rendering a guilty verdict on act/intent requires a 4/5 majority of the jury while rendering a guilty verdict on seriousness requires a simple majority. A jury must find an accused student guilty on both act/intent and seriousness to convict the student of an Honor Offense. Part of the research project regarding the Single Sanction included compiling post-trial survey answers from Honor jurors. The question read as follows:

“If you voted ‘not guilty’ on act/intent or seriousness, would you have voted differently if there were a sanction less severe than permanent dismissal from the University?”

Because of the wording of this question, it is impossible to determine with certainty whether jurors voted not guilty on act/intent or on seriousness.

The Honor Committee receives a random list of students from the University Registrar; this list reflects the diversity of the student body. The Honor Committee summons the students on this list for jury duty. The Committee conducts Juror Orientation sessions for potential jurors, and all potential jurors are required to complete a Juror Questionnaire that screens for biases in the jurors. These biases include, but are not limited to, gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, athletic status, and Greek affiliation. From a list of “dummy” names and the names of parties involved in upcoming trials, potential jurors are asked to identify all parties they know; they are then asked whether their acquaintance’s involvement would affect their ability to serve as an unbiased panelist. As another screen, jurors are asked whether or not the Single Sanction would have an impact on their ability to render a guilty verdict were all criteria for an Honor Offense satisfied.

All trial panelists have stated they are willing to enforce the Single Sanction, and they confirm they can apply the sanction in principle. Despite their affirmation to enforce the single sanction in principle, some jurors are unwilling to enforce the sanction during trials.

The votes of jurors depend on the details of each case and the preponderance of evidence presented at each trial. Because the trial process is not random (i.e. each trial is unique based on the evidence) and jurors influence each other’s decisions during deliberations, it is not illustrative to discuss how frequently guilty or not guilty votes are cast on the whole.

### **Investigative Panel is not a Predictor of Trial Outcome**

Of the data set analyzed, there were 85 total trials from September 2001 to May 2005. Of these 85 trials, 40 resulted in not guilty verdicts and 45 in guilty verdicts. There is no statistically significant difference between these two totals of verdicts, and therefore the *Investigative Panel is not a predictor of trial outcomes*.

### **More Jurors Would Not Have Changed Their Vote**

Regardless of vote or trial outcome, a significant majority of all jurors *would not have voted differently were there a lesser sanction in place*. Of 925 total jurors, 777 (84%) would not have changed their vote with a lesser sanction while 148 (16%) said they would change their vote with a lesser sanction.

**For Not-Guilty Voters Only**

In the 40 trials with not-guilty verdicts, 27% (90 out of 332) of jurors who voted not guilty believed they would have changed their vote if there had been a less severe sanction. It is important to note that *these are the only jurors who might make a trial have a different outcome*. In not-guilty trials, 73% (242 out of 332) of jurors were confident in their not-guilty vote based on the evidence, regardless of the sanction. There was a preponderance of the evidence in their minds.

In the 45 trials with guilty verdicts, 68% (44 out of 66) of those that voted not-guilty said they would change their vote were there a lesser sanction available. On the other hand, 32% (22 out of 66) of those that voted not-guilty in guilty trials said they were confident in their vote based on the evidence, regardless of the sanction.

We have summarized the above conclusions in the matrix below. The comments listed are hypothetical, but we believe the comments are indicative of their sentiments.

	Not Guilty Verdict	Guilty Verdict
Would Change Vote	<p>"I think this person is guilty. However, with the Single Sanction, I am going to vote not guilty. Were there a lesser sanction available, I would vote guilty." (27% or 90/332 jurors)</p>	<p>"I think this person is guilty. However, with the Single Sanction, I am going to vote not guilty. Were there a lesser sanction available, I would vote guilty." (68% or 44/66 jurors)</p>
Would Not Change Vote	<p>"The evidence in this case is clear enough regardless of the Single Sanction to find this person not guilty. I am confident in my vote." (73% or 242/332 jurors)</p>	<p>"The evidence in this case is clear enough regardless of the Sanction to find this person not-guilty. I am confident in my vote." (32% or 22/66 jurors)</p>

**The Effects on Verdicts If Jurors Would Change Their Votes**

*Were there a lesser sanction in place and the jurors voted as they indicated on their surveys*, it is likely that between 5 and 12 trials out of 40 would have had a guilty verdict instead of a not guilty verdict. We are uncertain whether the verdict was rendered on the grounds of act/intent or on seriousness.

Because act/intent requires a 4/5 majority and seriousness requires a simple majority, we can only be “certain” that 5 of the 40 not-guilty trials would have changed verdicts (at an 80% standard).

It is best to illustrate this with an example. Take case 03-08:

Verdict	# of Jurors	# of Guilty Votes	Changers from Not-Guilty	Outcome
Not Guilty	12	1	7	Guilty (51%) Not-Guilty (80%)

This case has two scenarios. One, the student was not guilty of act/intent. In this case, the student would still be found not guilty because 8 out of 12 are not enough to render a guilty verdict on act/intent (i.e. less than 4/5). In scenario two, the student was found not guilty of seriousness. In this case, the student would be found guilty because 8 out of 12 are enough to render a guilty verdict on seriousness (i.e. greater than 51%).

In trials with a significant proportion of guilty votes and more than two “changers” from not-guilty votes, seriousness was most likely the major criterion for their decision. The student accused of the offense is guilty of act/intent but the jurors were uncomfortable finding the student guilty because the act was not serious enough to warrant expulsion. For example, take case 04-09:

Verdict	# of Jurors	# of Guilty Votes	Changers from Not-Guilty	Outcome
Not Guilty	12	6	4	Guilty

Here, because 6 of the panelists voted guilty, and 4 said they would change their vote with a lesser sanction, it is likely that an intentional act of dishonor has occurred. With a lesser sanction, these 4 jurors would find the student guilty of an offense without expelling him/her from UVA.

### **Jurors Are Willing to Enforce the Single Sanction**


The evidence shows that jurors are able to enforce the Single Sanction despite the fact that some don’t like the sanction; that is, jurors sometimes regret voting guilty. Had jurors voted purely on their feelings of the Single Sanction, it is likely that 2 trials out of 41 would have a not-guilty verdict instead of a guilty verdict; to be clear, this results if the jurors had voted on their distaste for the sanction alone and not on the evidence at trial (nb: trials 01-158, 01-207, 01-111, and 01-163 have been thrown out of this conclusion because too few surveys were taken of these panels).

It is interesting to note that there are jurors that voted guilty but did not like it at all. These are the “regretors” who found the student guilty of an offense but expressed a sincere distaste for the Sanction in the survey question.

Take, for example, trial 04-32 where 1 juror felt distaste for the Single Sanction. The accused student was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but would have been found not guilty had the juror voted on his distaste for the Single Sanction alone (i.e. jury nullification). This indicates that jurors are willing to cooperate with the Sanction even though it causes unease.


### **Decline in Guilty Votes and Guilty Verdicts**

Since 2001, both guilty votes and guilty verdicts have been significantly declining.



#### Decline in Jurors Who Would Change Vote

Since 2001, the proportion that would change their vote with a lesser sanction has been significantly decreasing. As time passes, fewer jurors are saying they would change their vote with a lesser sanction.



When guilty verdicts are decreasing, not-guilty verdicts are increasing proportionately. With increasing not-guilty verdicts and decreasing "changers," the Single Sanction is deterring offenses. There are fewer students guilty of Honor Offenses. More are saying that the evidence is clear enough to make them confident in their vote regardless of the sanction. To put it a different way, there are fewer accused students that jurors want to find guilty of an offense with a lesser sanction, so there are fewer "questionable" accused students passing through the system, so the Single Sanction seems to be deterring Honor Offenses.



## Conclusions

This analysis provides some insight into the single sanction and its impact upon the Honor System. With respect to the general rate of cheating at the University, it is tough to determine the precise impact of the single sanction itself. The rate of cheating at UVA appears to be lower than it is at other schools without honor codes. It appears to be about the same as the rate of cheating at other schools with honor codes.<sup>1</sup> Success in this regard could be attributed to the single sanction, or it could be attributed to the simple presence of an Honor system at UVA. There is no evidence, however, that the single sanction is less effective or more effective than other sanctioning systems at discouraging cheating.

With respect to the single sanction's impact on students' willingness to bring knowledge of Honor offenses to the Honor Committee, this report has suggested that the single sanction does play some role in discouraging reporting-but not the most significant role. Other factors, especially a desire to avoid the time commitment involved, appear to play a larger role. There was no data available to determine whether another sanctioning system would lead to a different rate of student reporting.

Additionally, comparison of the 2000 and 2005 survey data seem to indicate increased deterrence of reporting due to the single sanction, but little change to students' direct opinion of the sanction itself. This comparison should be considered carefully in light of the differences between the two surveys and the difficulty of direct comparison. Future analysis should employ consistent language in both the question and answer choices.

With respect to the single sanction's impact on jury verdicts, this Committee has determined that the sanction does play a role in jury nullification, but this tendency has been decreasing over the past several years. A large majority of jurors do not appear to have been discouraged from rendering a guilty verdict due to the single sanction. Since 2001, a majority of trials have ended in guilty verdicts. Of those which ended in not guilty verdicts, our analysis suggests that between 12.5% and 30% might have been guilty if a less serious sanction were in place. Since 2001, the proportion of jurors who indicated that they would have voted differently with a lesser sanction has been steadily declining.

The Committee for the Investigation of the Single Sanction believes the above-noted data will provide future Honor Committees with valuable information and insight regarding the single sanction that may be used as they consider alternatives or defend the sanction against its critics.

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<sup>1</sup> Of the schools participating in the survey that had an Honor Code, one other school has a single sanction. To preserve the anonymity of the other schools participating in the survey, specific information regarding the other Honor Code schools was not made available to the Committee, though Professor Mc Cabe did indicate that most of the other "Code" schools were smaller and private. (Electronic mail communication, 1/30/2006)